Lease provided that D had right of re-entry upon breach of condition in the lease and a lien upon all of P's personal effects to secure rent and other charges.
P stopped paying rent after eight months.
D entered w/o P's consent and removed P's furniture to a warehouse and refused to allow her back in her apartment.
P filed action for forcible entry and detainer.
Procedural History
Jury returned a verdict of $6.5k for forcible entry and detainer and $3k punitive damages.
Supreme Ct affirmed.
Issues
When is a defendant landlord's reentry unlawful under 1159 or 1160 of CA code?
Is right of re-entry a defense to an action for forcible entry?
Can a defendant landlord assert a right of re-entry provided for in the lease?
Holding/Rule
A landlord's reentry is unlawful if it is forcible. Forcible entry is any entry that is not permitted by the tenant. No damage or actual violence is required.
Right of re-entry is not a defense to an action for forcible entry.
If a tenant is in peaceable actual possession, a defendant landlord cannot assert a right of reentry that is provided for in a lease until he has gone through the judicial process.
Any lease allowing for forcible entry would be void as contrary to public policy.
Reasoning
D contends that there is no evidence that he violated 1159 or 1160 of CA Code and therefore the verdict cannot be sustained.
D's right of re-entry is not a defense to an action for forcible entry:
P must show that he was peaceably in actual possession a the time of the forcible entry or was entitled to possession at the time of the forcible detainer.
D can show in his defense that he was in quiet possession for over a year.
Nowhere is it stated that a right of re-entry is a defense to an action for forcible entry or detainer and such a defense cannot be implied from the historical background or purpose of the statute.
Both before and after the enactment of the statute, courts have held that it is not a defense.
The inquiry is confined to the actual peaceable possession of the P and the unlawful or forcible ouster or detention by D.
The object of the law is to prevent the disturbance of the public peace by forcible assertion of a private right.
Absent a voluntary surrender by the tenant, a landlord can only enforce his right of re-entry through the judicial process.
Any lease expressly permitting a forcible entry would be void as contrary to public policy.
D was guilty of forcible entry:
D violated Section1159 when he unlocked P's apartment w/o her consent. There does not have to be physical damage or actual violence.
D also violated 1159 when he removed P's furniture and when D's employee yelled at P (as the jury could reasonably conclude that P believed any further attempts to enter would be met with force).
D was guilty of forcible detainer:
Force and menace can be implied from D's removal of furniture and his admonishment to "get the hell out of here."
D did not properly serve a three-day notice, and so D had no right of possession.
D was not authorized to enforce his lien by entering P's home:
Lease does not specify a means of enforcement.
Even if the lease had authorized forcible entry, it would be invalid due to public policy.
Dissent
The terms of the lease gave defendant a contractual right to enter the apartment and to remove the furnishings and therefore defendant has a complete defense to this action.
In Baxley, it was held that there was no forcible entry because the D's entry was not accompanied by violence and was peaceable, not unlawful.
Where there is no force involved in the entry, and where the entry is pursuant to a contract between the parties, the entry is lawful.
D used a key and there were no threats of violence established.
D had contractual right to possession so the taking of the belongings following lawful entry does not qualify as forcible detainer.
Court is aligning itself on the side of the person who breached the contract.
Notes
If the court had used contract doctrine, the tenant would have had to prove that the provision allowing reentry was unconscionable.
Instead, the court uses property doctrine and says that the right to reentry is inalienable.
